> "Gratitude is an emotion, the core of which is pleasant feelings about the benefit received. At the cornerstone of gratitude is the notion of undeserved merit. The grateful person recognizes that he or she did nothing to deserve the gift or benefit; it was freely bestowed" (Emmons 2004: 5).

> "To requite a benefit, or to be grateful to him who bestows it, is probably everywhere, at least under certain circumstances, regarded as a duty" (Westermarck 1908: 154; quoted in Gouldner 1996: 59).

The Two Faces of Gratitude: Favor vs. Kharis

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In the chapters of the second book of the Rhetoric that are conventionally numbered two to eleven, Aristotle analyzes, as we have seen, the several emotions or pathê that an orator should be able to arouse and assuage. In chapter two, he treats anger or orgê, in three what I have called satisfaction, in four love and hate, in five fear, in six shame, in eight pity, in nine indignation (to nemesan), in ten envy, and in eleven the emulous impulse he calls zêlos. Chapter seven (1385a16-1385b11) too examines a pathos -- but which? This is the question that occupies the first and principal part of this chapter; the second part considers some ways in which Aristotle's analysis and Greek usage generally shed light on a current problem in the philosophy of the moral emotions.

To go by all translations and all commentaries but one (Rapp 2002: ad loc.) on this section of the Rhetoric, the pathos in question would seem to be entirely clear, for they are unanimous on this score.[1] Here, for example, is the first sentence of chapter seven in Roberts' translation, published in the Bollingen series edited by Jonathan Barnes (p. 2207): "To take

Kindness next: the definition of it will show us towards whom it is felt, why, and in what frames of mind." And the chapter concludes in Roberts' version: "So much for kindness and unkindness." The subject of the chapter, then, is precisely kindness. Or again, consider George Kennedy's translation of the opening and closing sentences (1991: 149): "To whom people show kindliness and for what reasons and in what state of mind will be clear [to us] after having defined kharis." And (151): "This finishes the discussion of being kindly and being unkindly." Kennedy's headnote to the chapter reads:

> Kharis has a number of meanings in Greek -- "kindliness," "benevolence," "good will," "a favor," "gratitude," "grace".... Aristotle's definition in section 2 makes it clear that he is speaking about an altruistic feeling of kindliness or benevolence that at a particular time gratuitously moves a person to do something for another.

Or take Cope's commentary (1877: 87): "χάρις, the πάθος, or instinctive emotion, of which this chapter treats, represents the tendency or inclination to benevolence, to do a grace, favour, or service, spontaneous and disinterested to another, or to our fellow-man. It also includes the feeling of gratitude, the instinctive inclination to return favours received." In what amounts to a translation of the opening sentence (88), Cope writes: "The object of benevolence, the circumstances and occasions (on which it is exercized), and the dispositions, characters, and moods of mind (of those who exercize it), will be evident when we have defined benevolence." To be absolutely unambiguous, Cope adds that "'gratitude' and 'ingratitude' are not distinctly noticed in the chapter."[2]

Nor is this interpretation of the subject of chapter seven of Aristotle's Rhetoric a novelty. While I have not examined every translation ever produced (the number is very large, and many are difficult to obtain), it is clear that the modern consensus began at least as early as the Renaissance.[3] For example, Ermolao Barbaro, in his translation published in Basel in 1545, has

(387): "to which men, and in which matters, favor is seen to occur [gratia fieri videatur], and how those who do a favor [gratiam faciunt] are disposed, will be clear from the definition of the matter."[4] The commentary, which was provided by Daniel Barbaro, worries at the fact that in defining gratia or kharis, Aristotle includes the definiendum in the definition (426); but he rescues Aristotle from this elementary logical error by claiming that the kharis that is defined and that in the definition have different senses.[5] Clearly this distinction is contrived, though Barbaro was right to identify a problem here.[6]

In what follows, I argue that the emotion in question, however, is not kindness, kindliness, benevolence, "favor" or anything of the kind.[7] Spontaneous munificence (as opposed to the generosity that accompanies love or affection) is not an emotion for Aristotle, for it fails to conform to the precondition for any pathos, namely that it be a response or reaction to some stimulus or event. All the emotions analyzed by Aristotle are so motivated, from anger, which is provoked by a slight, to shame, indignation, fear, pity, and the rest. The pathos that Aristotle examines in chapter 7 is rather the gratitude that is elicited by a favor. Kindness, I am afraid, must be expunged from the list of Aristotelian pathê.

There is unfortunately no other way to make the case I am proposing than by a close scrutiny of Aristotle's text, sentence by sentence.[8] Luckily, he devotes only a brief paragraph to gratitude, and the exercize is not without interest for the insight it provides into his method of argument. The chapter, then, begins as follows: "Those toward whom people have kharis and in what circumstances [or for what things] and how they themselves are disposed, will be clear when we have defined kharis." What does "having kharis" -- kharin ekhein -- mean? It means to feel gratitude, and only that (e.g. Rhetoric 1374a23).[9] It never in all of Greek literature means to show favor toward someone, be kindly, do a service, or anything of the sort. The way to say "do

a favor" in Greek is kharin pherein, tithesthai, etc., or with the verb kharizesthai. By way of illustration, here is Plutarch's account of Cato's response to Lucius Caesar's offer to intercede in his behalf with Julius Caesar (Cato Minor 66.2): "If I wished to be saved by the benefaction [kharis] of Caesar, I should approach him myself. But I do not wish to owe gratitude [kharin ekhein] to a tyrant for something in which he violates the law, and he violates the law by saving me as my master, though it is not right for him to have despotic power." In the first use, kharis means "saved by Caesar's grace," in the second, it means "gratitude." Again, compare Pericles' account of the Athenian view of friendship in his famous funeral oration, as reported by Thucydides (2.40.4): "The firmer friend is the one who has treated the other well, with the result that, through his goodwill [for the one] to whom he has given it [the favour], he keeps it [the gratitude] owed."[10]

Aristotle next offers a definition of the term kharis, on the basis of which, as he says, the significance of kharin ekhein will become manifest: "Let kharis, then, in accord with which one who has it is said to have kharis, be a service to one who needs it, not in return for anything, nor so that the one who performs the service may gain something, but so that the other may." Here, I expect, is the chief source of the misunderstanding of this chapter. It is true that, in several other chapters on emotions, Aristotle uses the formula estô dê ("let such and such be...") to introduce the definition of the pathos under consideration, for example in the case of anger (1378a31), love (philein, 1380b35), fear (1382a21), shame (1383b13), and pity (1385b13).[11] In chapter seven, however, Aristotle offers a definition not of the emotion itself, that is, gratitude, which is signified in Greek by the compound expression kharin ekhein, but of the constituent term kharis. It is not difficult to see why, if we translate literally. Roberts offers the following, which is fairly representative: "Kindness -- under the influence of which a man is said to be kind -- may be

defined as helpfulness toward someone in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped." The redundant and awkward formulation, "Kindness -- under the influence of which a man is said to be kind," is evidently an attempt to escape the definitional problem signalled by Daniel Barbaro in his commentary of 1545. What the text says, however, is this: "Let 'a benefaction,' then, in respect to which the one who has it [i.e., receives the benefaction] is said to feel gratitude, be a service to one who needs it, not in return for something, nor so that something should accrue to the one who does the service, but rather that it should accrue to the other." As I understand him, Aristotle is here offering a punning explanation of how the phrase ekhein kharin ("have kharis") came to mean "feel gratitude": one receives or has a favor (kharis) from another, and in turn is said to feel or have gratitude (again, kharis). Barbaro was right that the two uses of kharis here are different; he failed, however, to recognize the force of the expression kharin ekhein.[12]

The next few phrases expand on the conditions in which a favor is likely to inspire gratitude. Thus, "the favor [kharis] is great if it is for someone in serious need, or in need of great or difficult things, or at a time that is such [i.e., urgent], or if he [who provides the service does so] alone or first or chiefly." Kharis here presumably refers to the service performed. Aristotle next specifies the nature of needs: "needs are desires [orexeis], and of these above all those that are accompanied by pain if it [i.e., the thing desired] is not realized. Cravings [epithumiai] are desires of this sort, for example erotic passion, and those desires connected with bad states of the body and with danger: for in fact those who are in danger and in pain do crave."[13] The text continues: "Thus, people who stand by those in poverty or exile, even if they do a small service, yet because of the magnitude of the need and the urgency of the occasion, are pleasing [kekharismenoi], like the man who gave the mat in the Lyceum [the reference is

unkown]. It is most necessary, then, to receive the service [ekhein tên hupourgian] in regard to these things, and if to not these, then to equal or greater things" (text according to Kassel 1976). There are two points that invite elucidation. The first is the meaning of the participle kekharismenoi. Roberts, for example, translates: "Hence those who stand by us in poverty or in banishment, even if they do not help us much, are yet really kind to us," etc. (my emphasis).[14] This interpretation favors the idea that kindness is the subject of this passage. However, it is highly dubious. The perfect participle is connected rather with the passive voice of the verb, and invariably bears the sense "pleasing" (over 50 occurrences in this sense in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.; for Aristotle, cf. Parts of Animals 645a4-10), which puts the focus on the recipient's attitude. The second point concerns the meaning of the phrase ekhein tên hupourgian. Again, Roberts translates: "The helpfulness must therefore meet, preferably, just this kind of need," which, while it rather fudges the Greek, suggests that ekhein bears the sense of "do" or "provide" a service. This yields an odd construction, rather like taking ekhein kharin in the sense of "do a favor." Hence, I have preferred to render it "receive a service."[15]

Aristotle proceeds: "Thus, since it is clear to whom and for what things kharis occurs, and how they are disposed, it is obvious that kharis must be elicited on the basis of the following: by showing that the one party either is or has been in pain and need of this sort, and that the other party has rendered or is rendering such a service in such necessity." It is clear that the first clause -- "to whom and for what things kharis occurs, and how they are disposed" -- answers to the clause with which the chapter begins: "toward whom people have kharis and for what things and how they themselves are disposed."[16] On my reading, then, kharis here must be understood as "gratitude," a perfectly good meaning of the term, rather than a "kindness" or "service," even though when Aristotle defined kharis ("let kharis ... be," etc.) he took it in the latter sense. [17] The

balance of the sentence surely favors gratitude. Aristotle is offering advice on how to produce kharis in an audience. In actual courtroom situations, litigants often emphasize the benefactions they have bestowed on their fellow citizens or the city in an effort to elicit the jurors' gratitude and make it clear that they have employed their wealth properly and for the public weal (cf. Fisher 2003). Rarely would one try to induce in an audience a sudden impulse to bestow a favor (acquittal or pardon do not count as a service or hupourgia). So too, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum advises that "people are grateful [kharin d'ekhousi] to those thanks to whom or to whose friends they believe that they or those they care for have experienced or are experiencing or will experience some good beyond what is due [para to prosêkon]" (34.2-3), whereas affection is stimulated by receiving what is in accord with desert.

Returning to Aristotle:

> It is clear too on what basis it is possible to diminish the kharis and render people akharistoi. Either [argue] that the one party is rendering or rendered the service for their own sake (this was said not to be a kharis), or that the service happened by chance or they were constrained to do it, or that they paid back rather than gave, whether knowingly or not: for either way, it is "in return for something," and so would not thus be a kharis.

The three uses of kharis here clearly signify a favor or benefaction, since (among other things) the stipulation that it must be altruistic refers back to Aristotle's definition of the term. The point, then, is that by showing that an act does not meet the conditions for being a kharis in this sense renders people akharistoi. The question is what this latter term implies. Roberts translates: "We can also see how to eliminate the idea of kindness and make our opponents appear unkind," taking akharistoi to mean refusal to perform a genuinely selfless act of kindness, and this is the standard interpretation. The difficulty is that akharistos does not mean "unkind." Rather, it means either "miserable," "unpleasant," or else "ungrateful."[18] The most telling instances are to be found in the works of Xenophon, where forms of the adjective and adverb occur twenty-three

times, virtually always in the sense of "ungrateful" (e.g. Hellenica 5.2.37: "for he was known not to be akharistos to those who had done him a service"). Indeed, Xenophon is kind enough to provide us with a definition of the term. At Memorabilia 2.2.1., Socrates says: --"Tell me, son, do you know that some people are said to be akharistoi?" --"Indeed I do," said the boy. --"And have you learned what those whom people call them by this name do?" --"I do: when those who are well off and are able to repay a kindness [kharin apodounai] do not repay it, this is what people call them." --"Ought we, then, to list those who are akharistoi among unjust people?" --"I think we ought."[19] Aristotle's meaning, accordingly, is: "It is clear too on what basis it is possible to disparage the favor that has been rendered and make the recipients ungrateful [akharistoi]."

Aristotle continues:

> One must also consider all the categories. For it is a kharis either because it is this particular thing or of such a quantity or sort, or at such a time or place. An indication of this is if they did not do a lesser service [when it was needed], and if they did the same things or equal or greater for one's enemies: for it is then obvious that what they did for us was not for our sake. Or if they knowingly did an unworthy service: for no one will confess to have needed what is unworthy.

There is no question but that kharis here means a concrete favor or kindness rather than gratitude: Aristotle is showing how the description of a favor determines whether the response to it will be gratitude or not.[20]

The chapter on kharis concludes: "We have now finished discussing to kharizesthai and akharistein." I have already cited Roberts' version of this sentence: "So much for kindness and unkindness." Kennedy's (1991: 151) is similar: "This finishes the discussion of being kindly and being unkindly." For the first term, I prefer "doing favors" to "kindness" or "being kindly," inasmuch as the latter terms introduce an unwarranted reference to a pyschological state.[21] As

for akharistein, the meaning must, I think, be "act ungratefully," although it is just possible, I suppose, that it bears the sense of "begrudge" or "withhold."[22]

Since gratitude is elicited by a service, it is no wonder that Aristotle's discussion of it focuses largely on what a service or kharis consists in. He is at pains as well to bring out the connection in Greek between the term for a favor and the expression meaning "to be grateful," that is, "kharin ekhein." To do a favor (kharizesthai) puts the recipient in one's debt. So too, the English word "oblige" means both to indulge and to put someone under obligation; in return for a service, we say "much obliged" (cf. Portuguese "obrigado" = "thank you"). This accounts for why Aristotle summarizes the content of his chapter on gratitude by referring both to the act of generosity (kharizesthai) and the response of gratitude, or rather, in light of his concluding remarks on how to belittle favors, ingratitude.

Performing a kindness is not an emotion; neither is kindliness, for that matter. If a favor were to be prompted by an emotion, the relevant pathos would be love or philia. The pathê in Aristotle are typically responses to the behavior of others, and more particularly to words or deeds that have consequences for the relative social standing or doxa of the parties involved. Gratitude involves just such a relative positioning, since it derives from the prior need of the recipient in relation to the generosity of the benefactor, and the continued state of inferiority until the debt can be repaid (in this, it resembles anger as Aristotle conceives it).

That gratitude should figure among the basic emotions analyzed by Aristotle is no cause for surprise, then, although it is very rarely encountered in modern lists.[23] For the ancients, gratitude was a powerful and innate sentiment. Cicero remarks of children, whom he takes to be a mirror of mankind (De finibus 5.22.61): "What a memory they have for those who have deserved well of them, what a passion to pay back a favor!" (quae memoria est in iis bene

merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas; cf. Barton 2001: 11). It was also vital to a society predicated on competition and reciprocity, where maintaining one's status in the forum of public esteem required continual effort and wariness.

We must, then, revise the standard list of basic emotions that Aristotle treats in the Rhetoric, expelling benevolence or kindness, which never did sound much like an emotion (how is it different from eunoia or good will?) and inserting gratitude in its place -- an emotion that would otherwise have been conspicuously lacking in a treatise devoted to rhetoric. But this is not the only consequence of understanding gratitude as the pathos Aristotle discusses in the Rhetoric. For gratitude has been interpreted by many scholars as pertaining to an obligatory system of reciprocal exchange, in which a service imposes upon the person who has benefitted from it a quid pro quo responsibility to render compensation. Is gratitude, then, a duty or at best a virtue rather than an emotion?

Aafke Komter (2004: 196), for example, argues that gratitude is not just a matter of "moral coercion" but is also "a moral virtue." She sees (208-09) gratitude as "part of a chain of reciprocity; it is universal and has survival value"; gratitude may be "a response to a voluntary gift but is itself imperative," and it "derives its social importance and effectiveness from the moral obligation implied in it." So too, Alan Gewirth (1978: 329) states: "As for gratitude, it should first be noted that the duty is not one of feeling grateful, since this may not be within the power of the person benefited (though he can try), but rather one of expressing gratitude in words or deeds or both for some favor one has received from another" (quoted in McConnell 1993: 83).[24] Aristotle's own view of kharis in the Nicomachean Ethics, according to Filippo Mignini (1994: 36), is that "only actual restitution and not the sentiment of acknowledging it satisfies the political requirement of equalizing the social balance sheet" (Solo la restituzione

fattuale e non il sentimento della riconoscenza soddisfa l'esigenza politica di pareggiare il conto sociale). Indeed, Aristotle affirms that "this is the nature of kharis: one must do a service in return for the person who did the favor" (NE 1133a4-5; cf. 1164b26-33).

Now, a social obligation may be mediated by, or take the form of, an emotional reaction comparable to the anger evoked by an insult, the fear at an impending threat of harm, or the shame deriving from an act that betrays a fault of character. As the sociologist Georg Simmel has put it (1996: 45), "gratitude emerges as the motive which, for inner reasons, effects the return of a benefit where there is no external necessity for it." Nevertheless, its status as an emotion seems particularly equivocal. Thus Terrance McConnell, who has written the first extended philosophical treatment of gratitude, states (1993: 112) that "the absence of feelings of gratitude is sometimes indicative of moral failure," but adds that "experiencing specified emotions and feelings is not morally required of an agent. As a consequence..., to discharge a debt of gratitude one need not feel grateful." He goes on to insist, however, that "there is more to ethics than overt actions, more to being a morally good person than doing what one ought to." The additional element is precisely emotion. So too, Hans van Wees (1998: 26) speaks in the same breath of the "law of gratitude" and a "feeling of obligation."

That the Greeks themselves could think of gratitude as a pathos is evident from a variety of sources besides Aristotle's Rhetoric. A particularly clear illustration may be found in another philosophical text, this one by the first-century B.C. Epicurean writer Philodemus, many of whose works have been recovered in mutilated condition from a private library that was incinerated in the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 A.D. In his treatise on anger, Philodemus draws a contrast between anger and gratitude: the one is a response to deliberately inflicted harm, the other to a voluntary service (On Anger Column 46.18-41). The passage reads (translation in

Sanders forthcoming):

> If the sage will feel gratitude [eukharistein] toward people who have treated him well, he will also get angry at those who intentionally harm him. And he if doesn't get angry with the latter, then he won't feel gratitude toward the former. For the one passion in each case is the contrary of the other, and the voluntariness moves us to anger just as it does to gratitude. For just as we do not feel gratitude toward inanimate objects that produce some effect, nor to those animate ones that provide us something by no choice of their own, neither are we angry at them. And they assert that we are naturally moved to anger just as we are to gratitude by the contrary cause.[25]

Philodemus' contrast differs from that of Aristotle, who treats satisfaction (praotês) as anger's opposite, since Aristotle restricts the cause of anger to a slight, whereas Philodemus understands anger as a reaction to deliberate harm in general (this is in line with the Epicureans' relative indifference to public opinion and their focus on the well-being of the individual).[26] But his argument makes especially clear the parallel between anger and gratitude as emotions.[27] That the emotion depends on a judgment of intention, and is not a mere irrational or spontaneous feeling, accords perfectly with the cognitive conception of the pathê endorsed by Aristotle. So too, forensic orators tended to contrast gratitude with anger,[28] and to pair it in turn with such generous sentiments as pity.[29]

Nevertheless, there are any number of passages in which the emphasis falls rather on the obligation to make restitution. One "demands back" (apaiteô) kharis for services performed;[30] in turn, one "repays" (apodidômi) kharis (Lysias 18.27)[31] or "owes" it (opheilô), and the one who performed the benefaction "receives kharis back" (apolambanô: Lysias 20.31). Kharis may thus be paired with timê or "payment" (Lysias 25.6). These locutions are too common to require further illustration.

Does Greek usage, then, simply reflect the confusion inherent in the idea of gratitude, which simultaneously signifies the moral acknowledgement of a debt and the emotion elicited by

a gratuitous act of generosity? It does not, but to see why it is necessary to attend not just to the word kharis itself but to its social and grammatical syntax as well. Kharis is one of the richer terms in classical Greek (cf. Chirassi Colombo 1994; Parker 1998: 108-14). It may mean simply "charm" or "pleasure." It may also signify a favor, as in the definition that Aristotle offers in the Rhetoric, and again the return for a service, as in the examples cited above. Finally, it denotes gratitude. Now, when kharis bears the concrete sense of due return for a benefaction, it occurs in locutions that specifically refer to payment that is owed, above all involving verbs with the prefix apo- (roughly equivalent to the "re-" in "return"; e.g., apodidômi, apolambanô, apaiteô). When kharis refers to gratitude, however, it occurs invariably in the expressions kharin ekhein (literally, "have kharis") or kharin eidenai (literally, "know or acknowledge kharis"). Ingratitude is akharistia, but there is no single term in classical Greek for the positive sentiment of gratitude apart from kharis itself.[32]

Whereas Greeks of the classical period demanded and repaid kharis (or a kharis) in the sense of the good turn deserved by another (cf. Sophocles Ajax 522: "kharis always gives birth to kharis)," the terms for asking or paying back are never found in connection with kharin ekhein or eidenai. The emotion of gratitude is distinct from the act of reciprocation: it is felt, not due as compensation. Thus Socrates, in Plato's Apology (20A), asserts that the disciples of the sophists "give them money and are grateful besides [khrêmata didontas kai kharin proseidenai]," that is, over and above the payment that is required. The sentiment of course sustains the social system of reciprocity, but has its own grammar and role. Gratitude is never owed.

It is natural that Aristotle should have concentrated on the emotion of gratitude in his treatise on rhetoric, since it is this sensibility, rather than repayment of an actual debt, that the orator would normally seek to elicit from his audience. His concern was different in his ethical

works. The emotion itself, as we have seen, depends on an awareness of relative social positions, but being grateful was not "regarded as a duty" (Westermarck 1908: 154). It was a response to the receipt of a benefit that had been bestowed precisely with no ulterior intention of gain on the benefactor's part, as Aristotle insists in his definition of kharis. Recognizing the distinct character of the emotion of gratitude, as opposed to the social obligation to repay a service, may contribute to a new understanding of the subjective dynamics of classical Greek reciprocity.

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Notes

[1] Christof Rapp and I arrived independently at the interpretation defended below, but he has the honor of priority in publication (As Rapp notes, Striker 1996: 301n15 had already adumbrated the view). I first presented my arguments in a seminar at the University of Toronto; I presented a revised version a year later (2002) at a conference at Rutgers University in honor of William Fortenbaugh. I wish to express my gratitude to David Mirhady and William Fortenbaugh for valuable comments on that occasion.

[2] So too the Spanish linguist Antonio Tovar (1953: 115) renders the opening phrase: "A quiénes se hace favor y sobre cuáles cosas, o en qué disposición, resultará claro una vez que hayamos definido el favor." The Penguin edition (trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred, 1991: 111) begins: "To what people men show favour," etc. The Budé version runs (trans. Médéric DuFour, 1960: 80) runs: "A l'égard de quelles personnes, en quelles occasions et dans quelles habitus l'on est obligeant, c'est ce que sera évident quand nous aurons défini cette passion." Franz G. Sieveke (1980 [3rd. ed. 1989]: 108 offers: "Wem gegenüber man Freundlichkeit (Wohlwollen, Gunst) erweist und wofür bzw. in welcher Disposition, das wird klar, wenn der Begriff 'Freundlichkeit' definiert ist." The Loeb version (trans. Freese 1926) has "benevolence"; the Spanish translation by Bernabé (1998: 166) offers "Con quiénes tenemos generosidad...," and the still more recent one by Ramírez Trejo (2002: 90) gives "Y a quienes hacer un favor...." And so on.

[3] What survives of the 7th-century Byzantine commentary by Stephanus of Alexandria (ed. Rabe) does not treat this section of the Rhetoric, nor do two fragmentary commentaries or periphrases (also edited by Rabe). The anonymous Byzantine commentary, or rather scholia, to the Rhetoric begin with the definition of kharis (108.9 Rabe), thus skipping the crucial introductory sentence in Aristotle; for the rest, the comments deal exclusively with kharis rather than kharin ekhein or gratitude.

[4] The full text reads: "quibus hominibus, et quibus in rebus gratia fieri videatur, et quo pacto affecti sint qui gratiam faciunt, ex definitione eius rei aperte constabit. Gratia est res, qua is qui facit et collocat gratiam, dicitur obsequi precibus, indigentiaeve alicuius, non reddendae vicissitudinis causa, aut gratiae referendae, sed gratuito."

[5] The passage reads: "aliud enim significat Gratia quae definitur, aliud Gratia quae in definitione ponitur. nam prior absolute beneficium non significat, ut posterior, sed beneficium quod gratia illius fit, in quem confertur. reliqua sunt facilia."

[6] So too Theodore Goulston, in his edition and translation of 1619 (p. 110), which was frequently reprinted (see Erickson's catalogue), provides the chapter title "De gratia seu Gratificandi affectu," and renders the first sentence: "Quibus autem Gratiam praebeant homines, et in Quibus rebus, et Quomodo ipsi se habentes, cum definiverimus gratiam, perspicuum fuerit: Sit igitur Gratia, per quam is, qui rem possidet, dicitur gratiam exhibere ei, qui indiget; non pro

ulla re accepta, neque ut quicquam omnino referatur ipsi qui exhibet, se ut illi soli, cui exhibetur, contingat bonum." The chapter concludes (p. 111): "Ac de conferenda quidem Gratia, et non conferenda dictum est." The sense of the phrases "gratiam praebere" and "gratiam conferre" is evident from "gratificor" in the chapter rubric.

[7] Nor again "obligeance," "Freundlichkeit," "Wohlwollen," "beneficium," or "se obsequia" (in the Portuguese version of Isis da Fonseca 2000: 49, 53).

[8] Here I supplement the rather more brief analysis in Rapp 2002.

[9] It is otiose to cite examples, but simply for the record, cf. Herodas Mimiambi 5.81: kai ekhe tên kharin tautêi, which plainly means, "Be thankful to her"; also Plutarch De audiendis 42C6.

[10] As Jeffrey Rusten (1990: 157) -- from whom I have borrowed the translation from "with the result that..." -- explains, "xa/rin dou=nai = 'grant a favour'; xa/rin o)fei/lein = 'owe gratitude.'"

[11] Aristotle varies the formula in introducing the last three emotions he treats, namely indignation, envy, and emulousness: for the first and last he employs the expression "if, then, it is... (ei gar esti, 1387a8-9, 1388a30), while for phthonos he uses the synonymous phrase eiper estin (1387b22).

[12] Compare also the expression aitian ekhein in the sense of "be accused," as opposed to aitian epipherein, etc., "impute a fault" (LSJ s.v. aitia; my thanks to Eckard Schütrumpf for this observation). Donald Russell suggests to me that kath' hên here may specify the sense of kharis according to which one who "has" it is grateful, that is, a disinterested service as opposed other senses of kharis such as "grace" or "charm."

[13] Why does Aristotle insist on the intensity of the need? According to Aristotle's definition of a pathos (Rhetoric 2.1, 1378a20-23), pain and pleasure are necessary components of an emotion, and the pain associated with gratitude might consist in a recollection of the disagreeable state that called for the favor. Being indebted to a benefactor, however, is in itself a condition of social diminishment, and enough to account for the unpleasantness of the emotion.

[14] Roberts thus associates the perfect participle with middle verb kharizesthai, which uniquely means "do a favor," "please," "oblige"; examples in Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1133a3-5, 1164b31-32; Politics 1263b5-6.

[15] It is true that lambanein or apolambanein would be the more natural verb (cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 2.2.5, 2.2.14). I suspect that Aristotle may again be playing with the idea that "receiving a benefaction" (tên kharin ekhein) gave rise to the expression "feel gratitude" (kharin ekhein), and is here simply substituting hupourgian for kharin.

[16] Compare 2.1, 1378a23-4, where Aristotle sets out three aspects relevant to the discussion of any emotion: pôs diakeimenoi [echousin], tisin and epi poiois.

[17] In the present passage, Roberts translates "kindness is shown"; for the meaning "gratitude" in Aristotle, cf. e.g. Politics 1334b40-42, on the kharis of children toward their elders.

[18] For the sense "miserable," cf. Euripides' Medea (chorus) 659-60: "May he die

akharistos who does not honor his philoi"; so too, in Isocrates To Demonicus 31.7-8 the adverb means something like "ungraciously" ("nor did he do favors ungraciously, as most people do"; note the wordplay in kharitas akharistôs kharizomenos). In Euripides Ion 879-80, however, it may well mean "ungrateful": "I shall not point out the akharistoi betrayers of the bed"; cf. Hecuba 137, 254. When Herodotus (5.91.15) speaks of the akharistos dêmos, the term clearly carries the sense of ungrateful (cf. Aristoph. Wasps 451).

[19] For the noun akharistia and the verb akharistein cf. 2.2.2-3; also 2.2.13-14, 2.6.19, 4.4.24; Anabasis 1.19.18.2, 7.6.24; Cyropaedia 1.2.7; Agesilaus 11.3. For the sense "unpleasant," see Oeconomicus 7.37, Anabasis 2.1.13, 2.3.18; for akharistein in the sense, "not to indulge," cf. Eryximachus in Plato Symposium 186C and Republic 411E2, where akharistia is paired with arrhuthmia and evidently means "gracelessness." On kharin apodounai = "repay a favor," cf. Isocrates 4.57; contrast kharin prodounai = "betray a kindness," Euripides Heraclidae 1036.

[20] When Roberts translates, "As evidence of the want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had been refused to the man in need," etc., he imports a reference to a disposition rather than an act, in accord with the supposition that kharis in this passage denotes a pathos.

[21] Paul Gohlke's (1959) "Über Dank und Undank is damit gehandelt" cannot be right in respect to kharizesthai; Gohlke's version is presumably indebted to Sieveke (1989: 109): "Das sei nun über die Erweisung von Dank und über das Undankbar-Sein gesagt."

[22] Cf. Plato's Symposium 186C (quoted above), where too it is contrasted with kharizesthai. The Portuguese version of Fonseca (2000: 53) gets it right, in my view: "Relativamente ao fato de prestar favor e de nâo retribuírlo, já tudo foi dito."

[23] Cf. Solomon 2004: v: "Gratitude is one of the most neglected emotions and one of the most underestimated of the virtues. In most accounts of the emotions, it receives nary a mention." Cf. Mignini 1994: 17 on the "inesistenza di una storia sistematica dell'idea di gratitudine nella letteratura filosofica o psicologica"; Mignini provides a survey of the concept from Homer to Kant and beyond.

[24] Cf. McConnell 1993: 3: "Richard Price lists gratitude as one of his six 'heads of virtue,' and of it says, 'The consideration that we have received benefits, lays us under peculiar obligations to the persons who have conferred them'" (quoting Price 1974 [orig. 1797]: 152); Gouldner 1996: 62: "the norm of reciprocity holds that people should help those who help them and, therefore, those whom you have helped have an obligation to help you"; Bollnow 1992: 37: "Die Dankbarkeit ist also eine Tugend." Note also Mignini 1994: 27: "Il sostantivo charis indica più spesso favore, godimento e gradimento. Ma vi sono anche testi nei quali si allude al ricambio dei favori come a un mezzo di equilibrio economico e sociale, o nei quali la gratitudine nei confronti di un beneficio ricevuto è considerata come virtù e dovere."

[25] Cf. Epicurus Principal Sayings 1; Letter to Herodotus 77.

[26] Cf. Roberts 2004: 75: "Like resentment and regret, envy is in some ways the reverse of gratitude, so that the disposition to gratitude tends to rule out the disposition to envy and thus to reduce episodes of envy." In this contrast, gratitude is a positive attitude toward the relative

prosperity of others, whereas envy and resentment are negative attitudes.

[27] Philodemus employs the term eukharisteô for "feel gratitude" (a Hellenistic or later usage, according to LSJ), in place of the classical kharin ekhein; cf. Bremmer 1998: 129.

[28] E.g., Lysias 12.80 (orgê), 27.11 (orgizesthai); Isocrates Panegyricus 157, On the Peace 14 (opposed to duskolôs diatithesthai), Aegin. 2 (contrasted with khalepôs pherô), Busiris 6 (contrasted with aganaktein and paired with praos); cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 2.6.21, 2.7.9.

[29] Cf. Lysias 6.3 (katakharisasthai paired with kateleêsai), 14.10; Isocrates 18.62 Against Callimachus on gratitude and pity owed to those who have earned it.

[30] Lysias 18.23; cf. 18.27 (exaiteomai), 21.25.

[31] Cf. dounai kharin, 21.17; also 30.27, 31.24; Isaeus 7.41, 9.23.

[32] As a disposition, ingratitude is also a vice or defect of character; thus Hecuba (Euripides Hecuba 245) brands the entire tribe of demagogues as ungrateful (akhariston, 254). It is worth remarking that in classical Greek there is no adjective meaning "grateful."